BESIEGED ON A FROZEN MOUNTAIN TOP: 
OPPOSING RECORDS FROM THE QING INVASION OF CHOSŎN, 1636–1637

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King Injo and his entourage remained on the summit of Mount Namhan for the greater part of the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn. During this time, court officials conducted intense debates as to whether to pursue continued military resistance against the Qing, or to conclude a settlement with them on the best terms possible. These officials have typically been placed into two political factions, the Peace Faction and the Anti-peace Faction. However, such a simple division obscures the complex realities of the political intrigue operative during the invasion. There are a number of records written during the short conflict. They offer glimpses into the actual, and often concealed, context of the political manoeuvres inside the besieged mountain fortress. Two diaries, Kim Sanghŏn's Namhan kiryak (Resource on Namhan [Mountain Fortress]) and Nam Kŭp's Namhan ilgi (The Namhan [Mountain Fortress] Diary), look at the war inside the fortress from two perspectives—the former from the point of view of a literati official who spoke of his own willingness to die, and the latter through the eyes of a military official who actually put his life on the line in defence of the wall. Rather than either protagonist embodying a self-contained political entity or representing the only logical conclusion to the war, the writings afford us clues as to the real and understandable concerns of individuals foreseeing an inevitable outcome.

Keywords: Qing Invasion of Chosŏn, Anti-peace Faction, Peace Faction, Kim Sanghŏn, Nam Kŭp, Mid-Chosŏn politics, diaries

Although only lasting a few months, the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn (K. Pyŏngja horan 丙子胡亂, 1636–1637)\(^1\) transformed the Chosŏn court’s political orientation and severed its allegiance with the Ming Empire. The success of the Qing

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\(^1\) Also referred to as the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea.
armies in Ming territory, along with the concentration of power and declaration of a pure imperial title to rival that of the Ming, could have proven the impetus for the Qing Empire to invade its southeastern neighbor. However, it was the decision of King Injo 仁祖 (r. 1623–1649) to not properly recognize the enthronement of the Emperor Hong Taiji 太宗 (C. Taizong, r. 1636–1643) that ultimately led to the Qing invasion and the personal surrender of Injo at the feet of Hong Taiji. The event reshaped Chosŏn political power and philosophy for centuries to come and led to a number of political and literary developments concerning Chosŏn’s place in a world without the Ming and a China ruled by a foreign power.2

The surrender of Chosŏn to the Qing Empire’s preceding dynasty, Later Jin 後金 (K. Hugŭm)3 during the Later Jin Invasion of Chosŏn (K. Chŏngmyo horan 丁卯胡亂, 1627)1 led to a peace in which Chosŏn promised to be on brotherly terms with the Later Jin and their Khan 漢 Hong Taiji. The debate concerning the peace of 1627 intensified the already fractious Chosŏn political spectrum, which is often described as being divided into two diametrically opposed camps.5 On one side was the Ch’ŏkhwap’a 斥和派 (lit. reprimanding the peace faction), referred to as the Anti-peace Faction in this paper, who supported an ostensibly pro-Ming policy. On the other side was the Chuhwap’a 主和派 (lit. advocating peace faction), referred to as the Peace Faction in this paper, which proposed a more conciliatory approach to the brooding conflict between the two empires.6 The members of the Peace Faction were labeled traitors by their political adversaries after the Qing invasion by the political opposition for the benefit of their own faction.7

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3 Later Jin was the designation given to the territory under Hong Taiji’s control from 1616 to 1636 before the declaration of the Qing Empire.
4 Also referred to as the First Manchu Invasion of Korea.
6 Hŏ Tægu, “Ch’oe Myŏnggil ŭi Chuhwaron kwa tae-Myŏng ŭiri” (Ch’oe Myŏnggil’s argument for peace and the issue of tae-Myŏng ŭiri [Loyalty to the Ming]), Han’guksa yŏn’gu 162 (2013), 87–122.
7 Hŏ Tægu, “Pyŏngja horan ihae ŭi saeroun sigak kwa chŏnmang—horangi ch’ŏkhwa’ron ŭi sŏnggyŏk kwa kŭ e taehan maengnakchŏk ihae (A new outlook and perspective on the 1636
The Later Jin and Qing Invasions of Chosŏn have been largely overlooked in English language scholarship. Most general English language Korean history books devote less than two pages to the conflict and there is barely any discussion on court politics during the period.\(^8\) Even the most detailed histories of the invasions focus on the perspectives of the Ming and Qing courts.\(^9\) There are a great many more histories of the conflict in the Korean language, both books and articles, that attest to the growing interest in the invasions.\(^10\) However, many articles and books written in Korean appear to have overlooked or misunderstood the development of Chosŏn political thought and court debate during the early and mid-seventeenth century. In particular, contemporary scholarship continues to perpetuate an internal fiction used by members of the court for their own purposes during and following the war.\(^11\)

The thesis advanced in this paper proposes that the true diversity of opinions within the government was buried under a slab of rhetoric only used to disguise the theoretical and political mêlée behind the scenes. The Ming Empire was not the most important aspect of Chosŏn political thought. Rather, state symbols, locations and specific people of Chosŏn were the most important for government officials of any factional affiliation. Only the levels of importance attributed to each aspect differed, and peace with the Qing appeared to be a tentative option for both factions from the start of hostilities. In order to unravel the dense network of arguments made during the invasion, it is pertinent to balance government records with individual perspectives. Even though there are not as many diary records from the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn compared with those written during the Imjin War (K. Imjin waeran 王辰倭亂, 1592–1598), there are more diverse perspectives on politics shown in diaries during the Qing invasion as...
compared with the Japanese invasion. A range of diaries were written by those in attendance on the king and by those defending the walls against the ever-encroaching enemy written during the hasty retreat from Hansŏng (modern Seoul) to the Namhan Mountain Fortress (K. Namhansansŏng 南漢山城). These diaries include the most popular and cited journal from the invasion, Na Man’gap’s 羅萬甲 (1592–1642) Pyŏngjarok 丙子錄 (Record of the Pyŏngja Year) and its seemingly redacted han’gŭl translation Sansŏng ilgi 山城日記 (Mountain Fortress Diary). Instead I have chosen two records by less cited and critiqued authors who offer strikingly opposing views of the invasion. These journals are Kim Sanghŏn’s 金尙憲 (1570–1652) Namhan kiryak 南漢紀略 (Resource on Namhan [Mountain Fortress]), and Nam Kŭp’s 南礏 (1592-1671) Namhan ilgi 南漢日記 (The Namhan [Mountain Fortress] Diary). The journals have been receiving increasing amounts of attention in Korean language scholarship, but have yet to be discussed in English language publications. The two records offer an opportunity to explore the diversity of the Chosŏn political spectrum, and by comparing and contrasting their experiences and stances on issues, I will attempt to ferret out the actual political debates and reasons for disunity during a time seemingly necessitating a united front against a common foe.

THE MARCH TO WAR

The philosophies and perspectives of the Chosŏn court and officials during the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn were shaped by both long-established customs and recent historical events. Devotion to a world-order with Chinese civilisation (K. Chunghwa 中華) at the center of the physical and philosophical worlds was an established and fundamental concept of politics in Chosŏn and linked the courts in Beijing and Hansŏng to one another. Chosŏn regarded the Ming, in practice

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14 Also referred to as the Pyŏngja illok (Daily record of 1636). Chang, “Nam Kŭp ŭi,” 141–147.
16 The concepts chunghwa is a historically and politically laden term. It can be interpreted with a great variety of meanings and possibilities. See Yuanchong Wang, “Claiming Centrality in the Chinese World: Manchu-Chosŏn Relations and the Making of the Qing’s “Zhongguo” Identity, 1616–43,” The Chinese Historical Review 22, no. 2 (November, 2015), 95–119; and, Pae Usŏng’s
and ritual at least, as the spiritual and political hegemon. In return for displays of obedience, Chosŏn kings became legally invested monarchs of the Korean Peninsula. The possibility of regular diplomatic missions and trade was also established. Culturally significant identifiers and symbols were regularly used in letters and communications within Chosŏn and when communicating with Ming. In particular, Chosŏn used the Ming Emperor’s reign year to date letters and documents (along with the sexagenary year date). Such manifestations of obedience symbolized that the country was committed to maintaining its position as a satellite around the main body of China. Although the Ming’s actual control over politics in Chosŏn was limited, the maintenance of symbols was nevertheless important for domestic and international politics on both sides. Therefore, it would come as no surprise that the Chosŏn court would seek to maintain this order and oppose the rise of an antipodal power. However, recent history, directly experienced by many of those at court, was more often cited as providing reasons for preserving a critical alliance with the Ming.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 豊臣秀吉 (1537–1598) invasion of the Korean peninsula resulted in the Wanli Emperor 萬曆 (r. 1572–1620) sending and maintaining auxiliary land, mounted and maritime forces to the peninsula even after the Japanese were defeated and departed Chosŏn in 1598. Following the war with Japan, some circles within the Chosŏn government even began to worship Chinese generals and gods of war, and also regularly referred to the benevolence shown by the emperor in saving Chosŏn. The concept, known as the “Favors of Restoration” (K. Chaejo chiŭn 再造之恩), may have been supported by the administration owing to the king’s loss of face and the evaporation of his power over the population during the conflict.

The “restoration” of Chosŏn by the Chinese army during the Imjin War was frequently cited by the Ming as ample reason for Chosŏn to send and supply troops and equipment to aid the Ming army. In 1616 Nurhaci 努爾哈赤 (1559–1626), Hong Taiji’s father, expanded his clan and declared himself Khan of a new country, Later Jin. Chosŏn reportedly avoided major clashes with the Jurchen...

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Later Jin as it continued to trade large amounts of clothing, cloth, paper, and salt with Nurhaci’s people. After the declaration of the Later Jin state, the Ming expressed their desire to go to war against Nurhaci’s forces, but King Kwanghae 光海君 (r. 1608–1623) was unwilling to commit fully to a campaign which threatened to bring renewed war to a weakened and battle-weary country. Chosŏn was eventually cajoled into the ill-fated northern expedition in support of the Ming in 1619, which culminated in the Battle of Sarhu 薩爾滸之戰, and sent 13,000 troops north. The Later Jin defeated the combined Ming and Chosŏn forces, head south, destroyed a Ming refugee camp in 1622, and came well within Chosŏn territory (approximately fifty miles) in pursuit of Ming forces.

King Kwanghae’s indecisive foreign policy gave rise to debates concerning the course of Chosŏn international affairs and were the precursors of what are now referred to as the Anti-peace and Peace Factions. In 1623 Kwanghae was removed from the throne, and a new king, using a mixture of philosophies and histories that focused on the restoration of Chosŏn during the Imjin War by the Ming, came to power. King Injo took the throne during his own “restoration”, Injo panjŏng 仁祖反正. By channeling the claim that King Kwanghae had both failed at domestic and international affairs, and in particular that he had abandoned the special relationship with the Ming, Injo asserted his righteous claim to rule. Yet despite this supposed newfound Sino-centric political purity, the new king never showed any real willingness to engage the Later Jin on the battlefield. Perhaps the opportunity never arose for Chosŏn to help the Ming defeat the Later Jin, but neither did there appear to be a burning desire from the

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20 Kye, “In the Shadow,” 188 citing the Kwanghae’gun ilgi (Daily Record of King Kwanghae’gun) 148:1a; 148:10b.
21 In the Veritable Records, King Kwanghae was not referred to as a true king, but rather as a Lord or Prince (–kun). Owing to King Kwanghae’s removal from the throne during Injo’s Restoration, Kwanghae was not given a posthumous royal title, and his records are referred to as ‘diary’ ilgi instead of ‘record’ sillok. King Yŏnsan (Yŏnsan’gun 燕山君) was also accorded the same treatment in the Veritable Records.
22 Kim, Voices from the North, 120–121.
25 Kye Sungbom and Han Myŏnggi both appear to argue that the notion of a special relationship and cultural reverence for the Ming helps to explain the most important reasons for King Kwanghae’s overthrow. Kye “In the Shadow,” 169–170.
26 It could also be argued that Chosŏn chose to rely on a Ming mercenary force commanded by Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576–1629). Ming forces were stationed on Kado Island (椵島) for over five years (1621–1627), and the Chosŏn court provided the foreign force with provisions. But, the Chosŏn court also became increasingly distrustful of Mao Wenlong’s perceived inaction against the Later Jin. See Swope, Military Collapse, 69.
court to march into another Sarhu. In addition, the years after Injo’s coup d’état were highly unstable and the new king almost fell to a coup himself in 1624. Discussions concerning Later Jin policy had become intensified since the enthronement of King Injo owing to his repeated calls to maintain strong political and cultural relations with the Ming while working against the rise of the new state.

The wavering political orientation shown by the new court did not save Chosŏn from the Later Jin armies and the invasion of 1627. As Chosŏn continued to station Ming troops and provide for them in Chosŏn territory, the enthronement of the Later Jin Khan Hong Taiji went unrecognized by the court in Hansŏng. Hong Taiji needed Chosŏn to recognize his rule for the Later Jin’s security, and to help cement his own position as a new ruler at home. During the Later Jin’s invasion of their country, the Chosŏn court fled to Kanghwa Island (K. Kanghwado 江華島) in order to survive the invasion or retreat to more isolated island refuges. In spite of the plans for continued resistance, the court appeared ready to proceed with peace talks immediately after the invasion began and any grander notions of protecting its alliance with the Ming were set aside to forward a tentative peace. When the enemy called for peace negotiations for “no good reason”, “listening to words [of peace by the Later Jin]” supposedly infuriated the Korean envoys. This was but a cover for the relief that Chosŏn felt after hearing that they would not be conquered outright and lose complete sovereignty. The peace treaty included provisions in which both Chosŏn and the Later Jin agreed not to interfere in each other’s domains. However, the symbols of Chosŏn’s international order were forcibly altered. The most symbolically important change was Chosŏn’s agreement to abandon the Ming reign title and have a treaty based on the relations of a younger brother and older brother. Members of the court seethed over the peace that made the Later Jin an older brother to Chosŏn, and relations continued to be tense between the two states. Chosŏn did not give up using the Ming Emperor’s reign date and only occasionally excluded it.

There were two courses of action set out before King Injo during and following the invasion. First, the course of action that was taken was to create and maintain a form of peace. The Chosŏn court continued to pretend that the ‘barbarian’ Later Jin was not actually a real country, and never assigned them a country signifier (K. kuk 國) given to states with perceived governments for negotiation. Still, Chosŏn treated the enemy as a foreign country and members of the court said that “As the Chinese have already approved of the peace [with the

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28 Injo sillok 15:5b–7a (1627.1.17).
29 Injo sillok 15:8b (1627.1.18).
enemy], how can we alone not accept it?" The second course of action was to oppose the peace with the Later Jin. After all, the rationale for Injo’s Restoration was to support the Ming and oppose the Later Jin. Finding itself in a difficult situation, the government attempted to legitimize its surrender to the Later Jin without losing its connections to the Ming Empire by openly admitting to its special relationship with the Ming and publicly acknowledging that the court did not enjoy having to make a peace with the Later Jin. The surrender to the Later Jin, and the debate over peace, became the foundations of the renewed Peace and Anti-peace debate, and, possibly, the factions who fought for political pre-dominance during the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn.

Even though the 1627 invasion ended in a peace treaty, the steady march towards a renewed conflict continued to brew over the following decade. Court officials attempted to rationalize Chosŏn’s increasingly tenuous position in regional affairs by combining a mixture of diplomatic formality and cultural burden pronouncing their devotion to the Ming. Yun Chip尹集 (1606–1637), who opposed peace with the Later Jin, was one of the three Chosŏn statesmen to be executed by the Qing for opposing the peace when Chosŏn surrendered. Yun made an appeal to King Injo in the eleventh lunar month of 1636 just before the Qing invasion stating that the Ming were like a “mother and father [for Chosŏn], and the slave-bandits (Qing) are the enemy of our parents.” After referring to the actions taken by the Ming during the Imjin War and the Later Jin Invasion of 1627, Yun finished his statement by saying that he “would rather that the country is destroyed than to be unable to uphold righteousness”, and that the country should resist the Qing at all costs.

The defiant calls for upholding righteousness appear to have been so strong that any sensible discussion outside of a narrow set of parameters of the situation was impossible. Yet, such an interpretation only presents a face-value appraisal of the internal debate. Yi Kwi李貴 (1557–1633) and Ch’oe Myŏnggil崔鳴吉 (1586–1647), who promoted the idea of peace with the Later Jin, were two of Injo’s Merit Officials who had supported his usurpation of the throne in 1623. Both Yi and Ch’oe supported the idea of peace in 1627 during the Later Jin Invasion of Chosŏn when concluding a peace treaty with the Later Jin Commander Amin阿敏 (1585–1640). Ch’oe and Yi supported a treaty that supposedly caused pain to those who read the message but brought an end to

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30 Injo sillok 15:14a (1627.1.22).
31 Han, Pyŏngja 1, 167.
32 O Talche吳達濟 (1609–1637) and Hong Ikhan洪翼漢 (1586–1637) were also executed by the Qing.
33 Injo sillok 33:30b–32a (1636.11.8).
hostilities and secured the Chosŏn kingdom a tentative peace.\textsuperscript{34}

Before the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn, Hong Taiji had sent word of his new empire and enthronement in the expectation of receiving commitment from his “younger brother” Chosŏn. Knowingly or unknowingly, he sent his message to a court that was unwilling to provide him with the response that he so desired. The Chosŏn court refused to meet with the Qing ambassadors, and news reached the Qing court that Chosŏn continued to supply Ming troops with provisions.\textsuperscript{35} In the twelfth lunar month of 1636, Hong Taiji invaded Chosŏn with close to 100,000 troops and quickly made his way to the capital. In two months, Qing forces had completely overrun Chosŏn’s defenses, and Injo sat in his fortress on Namhan Mountain Fortress for the majority of the invasion. The fortress lies five hundred meters above sea level and is around twenty kilometers south of Hansŏng. The wall measures twelve kilometers around the mountain-top. The steep hillsides favoured the defenders behind their stone wall and all but ruled out the use of cavalry and cannon in a direct assault. Although defensively sound, the fortress proved equally inaccessible to Chosŏn relief forces, and the winter weather atop the mountain range, along with a dwindling supply of provisions, became an unstoppable adversary. After two months of resistance, King Injo exited the castle with the Crown Prince, and together they humiliatingly performed three sets of three bows (K. sambae kugo turye 三拜九叩頭禮) and prostrated themselves at the feet of the new emperor. The war concluded with Injo and his government utterly defeated, the Crown Prince taken hostage by the Qing army to their capital. Although the peace treaty reiterated the alliance between the “older and younger” brother countries, Chosŏn had in fact become a state officially serving the Qing Empire (K. sadae 事大).

When the Qing armies flooded into the north of the country and appeared to be unstoppable, the court raced around to protect itself and its symbols of power, mostly shrines, tablets and seals. After the invasion commenced, it was reported that the tablets of the Royal Shrine were taken to Kanghwa Island for safety, along with the royal investiture seal bestowed by the Ming emperor.\textsuperscript{36} King Injo had prepared to make his way to Kanghwa Island before his route was blocked by the Qing army, but members of his family and princes were already on the island with the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain tablets. From atop the mountain to the south, Injo continued to proclaim that as long as he had the symbols of royal authority (i.e. the Royal Shrine and Altars’ tablets) and the faith

\textsuperscript{34} Injo sillok 15:8b (1627.1.18).
\textsuperscript{35} Swope, Military Collapse, 114.
\textsuperscript{36} Injo sillok 33:41a (1636.12.14).
of the people, an opportunity would arise for them to continue the fight.

The court then came under siege on Mount Namhan, and efforts by relief forces sent to save the king and move him to a more secure location for peace talks were abandoned as they could not gain access to the fortress. In spite of the rhetoric advocating fighting on the mountaintop, Chosŏn had no choice but to surrender to the Qing in the least advantageous location possible. Talks on the criteria and nature of peace between both sides started in earnest, and by the end of the first month of 1637 the government stopped using its delaying tactics and began to engage with and refer to the enemy as a sovereign country. Chosŏn court officials were forced to stop calling the Qing mere “barbarians” or “thieves” and began to refer to them as the Qing Empire around the end of the first lunar month of 1637. This was a phenomenal shift in policy and philosophy and was the most important bilateral event for Chosŏn from that time to the nineteenth century. The recognition of Qing’s title validated the new empire’s power and the subjugation of Chosŏn. Delaying tactics used against Hong Taiji’s envoys concerned internal politics and infighting alongside the mental struggle concerning the idea that a non-Chinese people could appropriate Chosŏn’s Ming-centered world order. Ultimately, Chosŏn officials realised that their military forces could not match that of the enemy and prostrated themselves at the feet of the new emperor. But was Chosŏn political opinion so divisive? Did these particular political factions, so often cited in contemporary sources, even exist as distinct political units in the seventeenth century? And would the Anti-peace Faction serve the Ming under any circumstances? The purpose of this article is to approach these questions by surveying two diarists’ perspectives during the conflict to uncover the diversity of viewpoints in Chosŏn during the Qing invasion.

THE DIARISTS

Kim Sanghŏn was born in Andong 安東 to a prominent yangban family. He passed the Literary Licentiate Examination in 1590 and served in various capacities during the Imjin War. Following the Japanese Invasions, Kim Sanghŏn was sent to Cheju Island for six months to oversee judicial affairs and governance after Kil Unjŏl’s 吉云節 attempted uprising. Kim Sanghŏn supported the Restoration of Injo and opposed the first peace with the Later Jin in 1627. As a

37 Injo sillok 34:1b (1637.1.2).
38 Injo sillok 34:2b (1637.1.3).
39 Injo sillok 34:9a–10a (1637.1.18).
political enemy of Yi Kwi, Kim Sanghŏn used retirement as a form of protest and continually rotated in and out of government service. In 1636, Kim served as the Second Minister of Rites (K. Yejo p’ansŏ 禮曹判書), a senior second rank position, and vehemently opposed a quick peace with the Qing. Even after the 1636 Qing Invasion, Kim Sanghŏn continued to criticise Qing proposals to aid in their assault on the Ming. Kim was subsequently taken to Shenyang 瀋陽 for four years until his release together with Crown Prince Sohyŏn 昭顯世子 (1612–1645) in 1645.

Kim’s Namhan kiryak includes a journal, letters, petitions to the king, and lists of whom he considered righteous individuals. The Namhan kiryak was clearly written to legitimize the actions of those who opposed peace (Anti-peace Faction) in the Namhan Mountain Fortress. Without hesitation, Kim placed the blame for the nature of the surrender squarely on the shoulders of his opponents. In particular, Kim Sanghŏn used the diary to discredit his opponent Ch’oe Myŏnggil, the chief delegate to the peace talks, on numerous occasions by giving examples of his supposed harsh and cruel attitude. Surrender to the Qing would entail the demise and capture of Kim Sanghŏn’s faction, and Kim advocated, “that which has taken place (i.e., the invasion) was inevitable, and our current strategy must certainly be to fight to the end.” However, it is difficult to designate Kim Sanghŏn’s Namhan kiryak as a diary. Although Kim began the resource using a standard diary format with dates, he skipped recording the exact day for a great many entries of the Namhan kiryak between the twenty-first day of the twelfth lunar month of 1636 to the twenty-third day of the first lunar month of 1637. Date information does appear, but infrequently within the text. Nor did Kim document the weather, which was common in a great many diaries of the period. Instead Kim’s record copies elements of the common diary style to house his political treatise. Kim had kept travel journals before on Cheju Island that followed the traditional style, but the Namhan kiryak is a mixture of two different writing styles to present his core argument as a record of his actions and as an essay-argument.

Nam Kŭp, born into a yangban military family, passed the Licentiate Examination in 1624 and was given the role of Royal Tomb Guardian (K. Chambong 參奉) in 1630. In the fifth lunar month of 1634, Nam Kŭp was

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40 Chang Kyŏngnam, “Namhansansŏng hojongsin ŭi pyŏngja horan kiŏk” (Memories of the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn by attendants of the king at Namhan Mountain Fortress), _Minjok munhaksa yŏn’gu_ 51 (2013), 230–256.
41 Kim Sanghŏn, _Namhan kiryak_ (1636.12.17).
42 Kim Sanghŏn, _Namsarok_ 南槎錄 (Record of the Raft to the South ) (1601). Kyujanggak (釜) #10796.
stationed in the capital as Curator of Palace Kitchen Management (K. Saongwŏn司饔院), a lower eighth rank military officer, until the start of the Qing Invasion when he marched with King Injo to Mount Namhan. His position as a lower level military official could have been the reason why his observations of events differ so sharply from Kim Sanghŏn's record. In Nam Kŭp's Namhan ilgi, we are presented with a Chosŏn completely unprepared for war. Even at the onset of hostilities, victory never seemed to have been a real possibility. After the king's failure to reach Kanghwa Island, which had been the gathering place for resources before the start of hostilities, the king's convoy changed course for the Namhan mountain fortress. Even before their arrival at Mount Namhan, Nam Kŭp mentioned that peace talks were initiated with the Qing. Having few supplies, King Injo was quoted as having recognized the severity and hopelessness of the situation. Nam Kŭp was not involved in the political infighting and diplomatic efforts with the enemy and this distance could have provided him with a different perspective. Nam Kŭp was stationed along the wall and defended it from the probing attacks by Qing forces. As a military official, he did not appear to directly take sides with either faction but commented on the state of the armed forces, the people in and outside of the fortress, and how the country should have maintained its amicable relations with the Later Jin and newly proclaimed Qing Empire. Nam Kŭp frequently stated that by insulting the Qing Emperor Hong Taiji, the Chosŏn court had ensured that the Qing invasion would occur. Nam's diary is kept almost daily from his first entry on the eleventh day, twelfth lunar month of 1636 to the fourth day, fourth lunar month of 1637. After the conclusion of the Qing invasion, Nam Kŭp became Director of the Royal Ancestral Shrine (K. Chongmyo chikchang宗廟直長).44

KIM SANGHŎN'S RECORD

Kim Sanghŏn's Namhan kiryak begins with citing the era reign of the last recognized Ming Emperor Chongzhen崇禎 (r. 1627–1644), not Hong Taiji of the Qing. In the entry, Kim mentions that he heard of a 'report of great urgency' (i.e., the invasion). This report arrived three days after the Qing army's crossing of the Yalu River (K. Amnokkang) on the tenth day of the twelfth lunar month, 1636. At home in Sŏksil 石室, Kim Sanghŏn readied to leave with his family and offered prayers to his ancestors. On the fourteenth day, Kim heard of the confusion and commotion surrounding King Injo's attempted flight from the

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43 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.18).
capital towards Kanghwa Island. After hearing that the king was on his way to the Namhan Mountain Fortress, Kim and his family decided to join the king and crossed the Han River. It was extremely cold and Kim wrote that, “Mium was already completely frozen, and so we carefully made our way over the river. It was already deep into the night. Tremendous wind and snow, and the horses were unable to proceed. Shortly thereafter, we entered a Kwangju tavern.” In the frigid chaos of the situation, Kim was told that the king was now on his way to Kanghwa Island and whipped his horses around when he was told that the king had abandoned any attempt to head to Kanghwa Island.

Women, the elderly and young children filled the streets and were rushing around. Whenever I asked people of the whereabouts of the king, people just said, “don’t know”. When we arrived at Samchŏndo, there were two cavalrymen. They had come from the mountain fortress at great speed. Mounted on their horses, the one who called himself Yi Siyong made a statement. “The king arrived at the mountain fortress this morning. He attempted to proceed to Kanghwa Island, but matters became urgent, and he found himself in a difficult position. He turned back, entered the fortress and dispatched his ministers to have an audience with the Jurchen commander. (They will) discuss (the terms of) peace.”

For the first time since the invasion, Kim introduces the idea of peace with the enemy. Kim does not initially give a reaction to hearing such news, but Kim’s antipathy towards a peaceful settlement only takes a turn for the worse when he hears the details of the proposed plan.

The king said, ‘I have not encountered those familiar with this matter (the invasion). How did we get to this point?’ [Kim] spoke, ‘How can I even speak of all the crimes committed by your ministers? Although we cannot admonish the past, the plan of the day should absolutely be to first make war and then peace. If those followers who serve (you) humbly request peace, then peace is an impossible expectation. A man of Song once said, “Through peace one can consider its appearance, through storage its value, through war its bravery.” These words, they are most pertinent for today, but I cannot fathom what the king must be considering.’ The king said, ‘The minister’s words are correct.’

[… ](Kim later heard that) Ch’oe Myŏnggil said, “The Jurchen only want to

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45 Kim, Namhan kiryak (1636.12.14).
46 Kim, Namhan kiryak (1636.12.15).
47 Wu Qian 吳潛 (1195–1262).
once more have an alliance, and there is nothing more to (their) intentions. If we were to send the crown prince as a hostage their armies would most certainly pull back.\footnote{Kim, Namhan kiryak (1636.12.17).}

It is clear from Kim’s initial entries that he feared the speed and ferocity of the Qing Invasion. Speaking to the king, Kim advocated that resistance before peace would be beneficial for the state, but Kim was reluctant to discuss this at length. Kim was slowly building up the rationale for going against the peace made by his opponents who advocated the Peace Argument, but Kim did not pour out all his thoughts at once. Kim also included a statement attributed to Ch’oe Myŏnggil that portrayed his rival as an enemy of the state and royal family by not being able to assess the intentions of the enemy. Kim finally gave more details as to why he opposed peace the next day after he heard of plans to give the crown prince to the enemy.

[…] As the day grew dark, Kyŏnggi Provincial Governor Yi Chahyŏn came to see me and said, “Sire, have you heard of the actions taken today?” I answered, “I don’t yet know. What has taken place?” He said, “Just now the great lords and their followers have requested to have an audience with the king. They want to make the crown prince a hostage and (send him) to the Jurchen camp.” Right at that moment I went straight to the Border Control Office […]

I went straight to see the Chief State Councilor and asked him the reason for this. He answered that, ‘We have no alternative for the benefit of the Chongsa (Chongmyo and Sajik: the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain).’ To which I said, ‘If the Chongsa have no master, then how can it be done for their benefit? How can it be that there are subjects who advocate giving over the crown prince to the enemy? I cannot stand to live with such people who would advocate such a policy! Prime Minister, go back inside right now and explain to them yourself the error of this scheme. If you do not, there will certainly be those loyal subjects and righteous men who will roll up their sleeves and rise up (against this plan)!\footnote{Kim, Namhan kiryak (1636.12.19).}

Kim left the hall, but he continued to comment on situations unfolding within the temporary palace. After building up his position over the previous few days, Kim displayed his actual reasons for continuing to fight the enemy. It was not any farfetched display of loyalty to a Confucian world-system but rather a plan to
protect and maintain the state and its sovereignty. Sovereignty in this case for the Chosŏn state was contained within the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain and the loss of the future of the dynasty and caretaker of the shrines, the Crown Prince. A more careful reading reveals that Kim was not actually pressing for a full military victory over the Qing, but instead a change in the terms of surrender. For Kim, it was clear that the terms of surrender could not have been any more severe and that the state would completely lose its sovereignty if it were to concede at that time. Fighting and making an opportunity for changes to the outcome, no matter what the cost, was not an ideologically driven argument but a somewhat reasonable choice regarding the current situation. Therefore, the differences of opinion between the people on the Peace and Anti-peace sides appear to have concerned the nature and timing of surrender rather than a fight to the death over political loyalties to the Ming. Even the king later acknowledged that although it was difficult for him to send the Crown Prince away, he considered the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain to be more important than the Crown Prince. Kim also ensured that he included a note mentioning how Ch’oe Myŏnggil eased King Injo’s hesitation on sending the Crown Prince by informing him that it was the only right course of action.

As the political battle between the Peace and Anti-peace Factions simmered, another division and fight began to take place between the Anti-peace Faction and the military officials. Kim recorded that those arguing for peace celebrated the plans to send the Crown Prince, the commanders simply wanted to surrender to preserve their own lives.

[…]. In secret, those generals who defended and fought for the king caused it so that they could not easily move forward and erred in every way imaginable. Already they did not have the heart to die. They were so scared at the sight of the enemy, they fled and did not venture out. This was their plan for self-preservation.

Kim continued to write about a conspiracy afoot involving the military and those who called for peace. While the military tried to hold back and not attack the enemy in any way possible, those arguing for peace sought to promote their own people to power and planned to even kill those opposed to the peace. It seems, however, that this discussion initiated by Kim concerning the military was in fact a cover for the distrust and animosity between military commanders and the so-

50 Kim, Namhan kirya (1636.12.19).
51 Kim, Namhan kirya (1636.12.20).
52 Kim, Namhan kirya (1636.12.19).
called Anti-peace faction. As discussed later in Nam Kŭp’s diary, the military foresaw the actual security situation and forced the Anti-peace coalition to give up their delaying tactics.

As time passed, Kim became increasingly determined to defend his political allies and the crown prince. Kim recorded officials mentioning that the breaking of the 1627 peace treaty was an inevitability. Other officials countered these assertions by mentioning that if the court had received the Qing ambassador’s letter then by receiving it and replying, “recognising the presumptuous works crowning the Jurchen Khan would actually have preserved our country.”

Opinions were clearly mixed at court, and Kim did not hide all opinions countering his own increasingly embattled position. Kim Sanghŏn held that ‘The Jurchen come again and again to chase profit, the men and horses are all tired, [...] we can attack by smashing their vanguard, so that they would draw back.’

Kim’s early attempts to rationalize his decision to oppose peace became increasingly tenuous and illogical, due to his concerns for the state, his friends’ lives and his own life. The demands of the Qing that those opposing the peace be handed over must have caused fear in all those officials who had fought for opposing the Qing. But for a few moments, Kim slowly conceded that the government could not be saved.

We have been encircled for some many days and as we were unable to carry out our plans, we ordered for prayers to be made to the Sŏnghwang Shrine and Paekje’s Sijo Shrine in order to seek an otherworldly answer. I undertook these offerings twice.

In addition, Kim recorded that,

The king’s army had arrived but they had all been routed and scattered. And the Jurchen’s aspirations were getting prouder with each passing day and our power and advantages were diminishing. Those charged with leading the army only had their minds on begging for peace and the morale of the soldiers disappeared.

The awareness that surrender was only a matter of time drove Kim to display his devotion and loyalty to the crown and state. In fact, he had no option but to show his displeasure at the situation through increasingly bold and dangerous actions.

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53 Kim, Namhan kiryak (1636.12.19).
54 Kim, Namhan kiryak (1636.12.20).
55 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa late 1636.12).
56 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa late 1636.12).
This culminated in Kim’s personal tearing up of the response letter intended for the Qing Emperor in the court. Everyone commented on this, and Nam Kŭp also recorded the event. Still, Kim’s increasingly erratic behavior did not save the situation. After a month inside of the fortress, with all hope of a relief army gone and supplies running low, Kim went to Injo and asked to be executed for his actions of tearing up the letter. To this Injo said,

Sir, why do you speak these words? I am not pursuing this policy for myself alone but for the Royal Shrine and Altars. Also, I cannot endure having my family perish, and all the royal family are within the castle.

Citing the Disorder of the Jingkang Period, Kim replied that Emperor Qinjong of the Song, faced a similar situation when his advisors recommended that he have an audience at the enemy (Jurchen) camp. In not dying for the Royal Shrine and Altars, Kim argued that the lords who advocated surrender played a role in his dethroning. Kim continued by stating,

In addition, the ferocious barbarians’ hearts could not be (accurately) judged, so it is a mistake for the king to pursue peace-talks with them. As of now, the hearts of our soldiers have not changed and remain the same, and we have enough supplies to hold out for a month. As the castle is in a very steep area, even though the enemy has many soldiers, they are utterly unable to make a full assault. [...] As the court founded our country (Chosŏn) and was certainly righteous and just in doing so, now if we bow our heads and become a subject of the barbarians and follow their commands, where will they not reach to in the future?

Kim returned to his original statements made in the mid-twelfth month 1636 when the king arrived at the mountain fortress. Kim’s argument centered on the fact that the king could not possibly trust the Jurchen Qing as they were capricious, and that they would lead the country astray in the future. Kim was either making a very astute observation on the future of Qing-Chosŏn relations, or Kim added this information after his return to Chosŏn and was commenting on the kingdom’s future participation in fighting the Ming.

Then, at the end of peace negotiations, there was a call for the Anti-peace Faction to be led down the mountain and be handed over to the Qing for

57 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa late 1636.12).
58 Concerning the capture of Emperor Huizhong 宋欽宗 (r. 1100–1126).
59 Emperor Qingzhong (r. 1126–1127).
60 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa 1637.1.17).
punishment. In the discussion concerning which people or what actions constituted Peace or Anti-peace, Kim wrote that those arguing for peace attacked all those who were against the peace, while others were quoted as having argued against grouping those who opposed the war into a single group. Members of the Anti-peace Faction claimed that their faction was only being loyal to the crown. Kim wrote that Ch’oe Myŏnggil and his followers said that ‘Yun Chip and O Talche must be sent to the enemy camp.’ Members of the opposition replied that [...] ‘if we were to designate the Anti-peace as in the letter, then it means that it is not their crime.’ Ch’oe Myŏnggil replied that, ‘It is those who strongly attacked those arguing for the peace, and this is why they are anti-peace.’

In this situation, those who were against peace were slowly running out of time, and the military, who Kim had previously chastised for being ineffective and self-serving, entered into the court and demanded that the Anti-peace Faction be given to the enemy as soon as possible.

[...] Ku Inhu led those under his command. The commander and army came to the gates of the temporary court to find those subjects arguing against peace so that they could give them to the enemy. But as soon as the king heard this, he persuaded them to leave. General Sin Kyŏngjin and Ku Kwang’s forces came and banged on the gate, their voices were very rough. The king sent a Royal Secretary-transmitter to dissuade them again, but they did not leave.

With resistance at an end, the king and crown prince exited the fortress to surrender to Hong Taiji. As Kim headed down the mountain to the Chosŏn capital, his last entry blamed those who called for this peace for the defeat.

After the first day of the second lunar month, those [government officials] [...] who pressed for the surrender, and military officials who blindly followed them [...]. These people gathered and happily plotted their scheme. Personally, they flattered one another; I cannot record all that Ch’oe [Myŏnggil’s] group did.

Kim Sanghŏn ends his diary with a parting shot at Ch’oe Myŏnggil. Being an opponent of Ch’oe for over a decade added to his hostility. Still, the two ministers and their factions were not opposed to ending the war by peace, but Kim Sanghŏn’s ideological adherence became stronger as his actual political options

61 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa 1636.12.20).
62 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa 1637.1.20-21).
63 Kim, Namhan kiryak (circa 1637.2.1).
became restricted on the mountain top.

**NAM KŬP’S RECORD**

Nam Kŭp began his diary citing the era reign of the last recognized Ming emperor. Stationed in the capital, Nam Kŭp heard rumors of the war only on the twelfth day of the twelfth lunar month, 1636. Nam was then given full details of the invasion on the morning of the thirteenth. However, in the entry for the thirteenth, Nam Kŭp indicated his political leanings and outlook on the conflict.

After hearing that the Qing had reached P’yŏngyang, the Chosŏn capital fell into a panic, and a steady stream of people began to leave. In the chaos, Nam Kŭp’s diary contains a comment on the peace made in 1627 and the declaration of the new Qing Empire.

[When] the Khan (Hong Taiji) had sent an ambassador to say “Our Emperor has now been enthroned, the country’s name is Qing, and the foundation year is Sungdŏk (C. Chongde). As Older and younger brother countries, it is certainly righteous to inform one another and (you in turn to) notify us.” Of those debating the letter, many held that, “As we have already established peace, we should treat them well.” Seeing the change in the situation, Hong Ikhan and the others demanded that, “As they have already named the emperor and a foundational year, then (there is only) that we acknowledge allegiance to them and giving tribute is not far off. This is not in keeping with loyalty serving the Ming, and it would be better to execute their ambassador and cut off this peace.” The Jurchen ambassador heard this and immediately returned to his country. People knew that the Qing would certainly sack [Chosŏn], so the court gathered provisions in Kanghwa and stocked up on horse-feed (grass) and planned their escape in advance.64

While the news of the invasion sent the capital into chaos, members of the royal family, along with the tablets from the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain, were quickly moved to Kanghwa Island.65 The king planned to join them, however, it was decided that it was too late for him to march to Kanghwa. Instead, Ch’oe Myŏnggil was dispatched to delay the enemy’s arrival.

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64 Nam Kŭp, *Namhan ilgi* (1636.12.13).
The Minister of Personnel, Ch’oe Myŏnggil said, “I will go to meet with the Jurchen (Qing) general and by these means stave off his vanguard.” Ch’oe Myŏnggil had experience in promoting peace and the Jurchen already knew this.

Nam Kŭp left the capital headed towards the mountain fortress with the king and arrived at the summit of Mount Namhan. In spite of the tentative peace to be made with the Qing, King Injo still wanted to ensure that his position was stronger, for negotiations or war, by relocating to Kanghwa. On the fifteenth day, Nam wrote that the king and his entourage quietly left Namhan fortress in an attempt to get to Kanghwa but were unable to proceed and returned the same day. Ch’oe Myŏnggil arrived from the enemy camp to see the king and announced the terms of the peace. Again, the court tried to buy time by sending Injo’s younger brother to the enemy as a potential hostage, but this was rejected by the Qing. On the sixteenth day of the twelfth lunar month the Qing army came to the southern gate of the mountain fortress, and the Chosŏn military were criticised for their inability to detect the enemy’s advance. However, Nam praised the commanders for having arranged the defenses on Namhan in only fifteen days.

Nam Kŭp wrote that he heard of Kim Sanghŏn’s opposition to sending the crown prince to the enemy. Still, Nam and the others had hope that a relief force might give the king and crown prince an opportunity to escape. During this time the soldiers began to eat dead horses, and the Qing began to encircle the mountain fortress with their own wooden battlements. Then the thin sliver of hope kept by the government vanished when news of the relief forces’ destruction reached the fortress on the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth lunar month. In order to hasten Injo’s capitulation, the Qing continued to send letters demanding his surrender. Although the Chosŏn government called the Qing “barbarians”, the Qing letters always addressed the Chosŏn government in a polite tone. The Qing asked in a letter,

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66 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.14).
67 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.15).
68 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.16).
69 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.17).
70 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.22).
71 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.12.25).
72 This news could also have been delivered by people who received disinformation from the Qing army in order to hasten the fortress’ surrender.
We have seen the letters of your esteemed country. They all call us slave-thieves, but what type of slaves are we? The works we have founded are just and honorable, and who among us would dare call the Chosŏn (people) thieves?  

Nam then reported that Hong Taiji sent a letter to Injo, addressing him by his royal title and requesting for him to come down from the mountain. In the midst of peace talks, internal letters by Chosŏn ministers began to refer to the Qing using their proper title, and not ‘slave-thieves.’ This was to ensure that the Qing were not angered and peace talks were not suspended. In addition, Nam recorded that in diplomatic letters, Chosŏn became the Small Country (K. soguk 小國) and Small region (K. sobang 小邦) while Qing became the Great Country (K. taeguk 大國). It is clear the Nam saw the steps taken to hasten peace and may have tentatively agreed with them as there was no possible strategy to win the war. Members of the Chosŏn court (Peace Faction) prepared a message for Hong Taiji that praised him and testified to their growing hesitation to provoke the Qing. After stating that the small region was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the new emperor, the letter stated that,

Lords and subjects, fathers and sons, have remained for a long time in this isolated fortress, and their destitution is extreme. Truly at this time, should we receive from the Great State the swift recognition of our errors, and be allowed to renew ourselves, then we will be able to conserve our Royal Shrine and Altars and long serve the Great Kingdom.

This letter ends with the statement that the “Small Region’s lord and subjects will inscribe and carve deep gratitude and respect for (the emperor in our hearts), that even our descendants shall never forget.” However, the increase in communications praising the Qing emperor only reflected the deteriorating situation inside the mountain fortress.

From the beginning of the crisis until now, twenty-nine days have passed. We are cut off from the hope of outside rescue. People have certainly died, and there are many more who continue to flee. Initially, there were those who called for fighting with tremendous energy, but now those people say

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73 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.2).
74 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.1.12).
75 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.1.12).
76 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1636.1.12).
Yet, Nam recorded that Kim Sanghŏn and Chŏng On continued to call on all the senior soldiers and officials to die in order to get an opportunity to change the situation. These requests, that at first could be understood, fell on deaf ears by the middle of the first month. Nam Kŭp did not support the Qing and called the Jurchen 'thieves', but even he saw that Chosŏn was unable to win the conflict. However, the Anti-peace Faction did not stop attempting to prolong the war. Yi Sŏnggu, along with Kim Sanghŏn, yelled at Ch’oe Myŏnggil, “[…] what of our king and the Royal Shrine and Altars (Chongsa)?” Kim Sanghŏn then promised to give up his own life in defense of the country. Yet behind all the bluster, the march towards surrender was clear in Nam’s diary. The call was clear on the first week of the war as it remained clear in the closing days. Just before his surrender, the crown prince called on the officials and told them of the reasons why he should submit.

I already have a son and also have younger siblings. How can I selfishly keep my own body and not preserve the plans of the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars? I will leave the fortress tomorrow, and I request that you prepare my convoy and a horse.

As with Kim Sanghŏn, Nam frequently cites the symbols and locations that were important to the Chosŏn state. The life of the state, rather than the life of the individual, was regarded in Nam’s writings as being of a higher order. This was not the approach taken by Kim Sanghŏn, who venerated the crown prince’s existence in the country as custodian of the Royal Shrine and Altars. As the court wrangled over the political affairs of the state, the military was growing tired of waiting while soldiers froze to death defending the walls. In the infirmary, Nam Kŭp heard several soldiers say.

“Perhaps if this country had no literati, then we could be at peace.” Also [they said], “Every time I see a renowned scholar then I want to clutch my dagger.” Of the military men, they recognised that they would certainly die, but they were furious at the Anti-peace supporters, and raised matters like these.

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77 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.12).
78 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.12).
79 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.18).
80 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.22).
81 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.23).
The military's frustration at the literati and officials began to reach its highest point when the generals noticed the installation of Qing cannon outside of the fortress. From this point forward the military began to pressure the government to send the crown prince to the enemy camp. Then on the twenty-sixth day, the military stormed into the temporary government.

The generals and soldiers went up to the palace and called for those who opposed the peace to be tied up and be handed over. They said, “We are surrounded by cannon, the battlements exhausted and broken. Even though we are already arrived to this extremely dangerous situation, these literati and the like make only lofty words, (so) call and order them to defend and hold the Full Moon Tower!”

This was the exact entry that Kim Sanghŏn had also recorded. However, Kim had conveniently left out information concerning the installation of cannon and the increasing military threat to the fortress. Although these actions by the generals expedited the surrender, the calls for surrender were hastened by the news that Kanghwa Island had fallen on the same day. After hearing the reports, King Injo is reported to have said, ‘The Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain [tablets] have already fallen and I am unable to do anything.’

A letter praising the arrival of Hong Taiji was swiftly drafted. The Chosŏn message confirmed that the court would surrender the crown prince, not on account of the numerous cannons outside the fortress or the capture of the royal family and state tablets, but due to the emperor’s brilliance. All notes calling the Qing slaves, thieves or bandits were to be torn up, and Kim Sanghŏn was briefly tied up, only for him to later be unbound by his supporters. At the end of the siege, Nam Kŭp reported on a conversation between the Qing commander Ingguldai (1596–1648) with Ch’oe Myŏnggil and two others. Ingguldai asked,

“How will you behave when your country receives a letter from the Southern Court (Ming)?” [The officials] answered, “Those who receive the letter will sit facing south and the minister receiving it will be seated.” […] A summary of the letter's contents were that “In the future, when (Chosŏn) presents the (Ming's) Letter of Investiture, books, jade seals and admit our crimes [to the Qing], we will cut off relations [with the Ming]

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82 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.24).
83 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.26). Mangwŏltae 望月臺.
84 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.27). The fall of Kanghwa also ensured that Emperor Hong Taiji could use the royal family as a bargaining tool in his diplomacy with King Injo.
and cast aside the (Ming) era name.85

In other words, Chosŏn stated that it would not treat the Ming as a superior, but an inferior state in diplomatic relations and recognise the hegemonic power of the Qing. Although Nam Kŭp did not identify himself with any one faction, he presented peace as the only rational option for Chosŏn. For these reasons, we can associate Nam with those who supported peace more readily than those who opposed peace. However, Nam and Kim shared many similarities in their writings and perspectives, even though they had entirely different writing styles. Nam did not appear overly concerned with supposed loyalties to the greater Ming and recorded statements concerning symbols and locations important to the state. However, Nam never wrote directly on his own thoughts concerning the war (as Kim Sanghŏn did). It appears that pragmatic decision-making for the Chosŏn state, people and king (and his own life) were paramount for Nam Kŭp, and that a quick peace was the only viable solution.

Nam Kŭp continued to write his diary after the surrender of the fortress when Mongol soldiers86 came in to pillage and take what they could. In a sign that the Qing were somewhat civilised, Nam also wrote that the Qing ordered that no pillaging was to take place and even ordered the execution of Mongol troop looters. Although the siege ended, the diary and its contents continued to revisit aspects of the conflict. Most interesting in the collection is a note following the diary which sums up what Nam was seeing and feeling at the time.

[...] For the most part, our country is fundamentally different from the Song (Ming). Due to the fact that the Song is a land desired by the barbarians, and as our pact with the barbarians was like iron or rock, there was no reason to break it. As our country was a land ignored by the barbarians, if we had merely not opposed them, I certainly believe that they would have been no reason for them to attack us. Even though we could not say that the strategy that brought peace in 1627 was a good strategy, there were good diplomatic missions coming and going. As we did not have plans for self-strengthening, then was it not unreasonable of those to rashly end friendly relations and think it was a good, profitable plan?

Furthermore, according to the note carried by the barbarian envoy in 1636, [it read], “Since I (Hong Taiji) have risen to the seat of emperorship, I cannot but announce this to my brother country.” But since there was not a quick response in which the subject said that he would obey, even though

85 Nam Kŭp, Namhan ilgi (1637.1.28).
86 Nam wrote that ethnic Mongol troops entered the fortress and began to pillage.
those who made this policy for our country [of not congratulating Hong Taiji, did so because] because of criticism concerning the obligations and moral righteousness for the Ming, are these none other than those who turn their backs and talk nonsense?

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to introduce two diaries that capture the diversity of Chosŏn political thought during the Qing Invasion of Chosŏn in 1636. Although Kim Sanghŏn and Nam Kŭp’s diaries document the same conflict from the same location, they diverge on almost every issue and even their writing styles are completely different. In order to understand the complex social and political issues raised in their diaries, both a broad and narrow view of regional history is required. Customs and cultural connections with Chinese civilization (Chunghwa) that went back centuries, as well as military assistance provided by the Wanli Emperor during the Imjin War only four decades before the Qing invasion, remade Chosŏn political identity and formed the basis of court discussion in 1636. The diaries demonstrate how court officials used these ideas to advance their own positions, while vying for representation and control.

Even though it is clear that Kim Sanghŏn and Nam Kŭp’s records are important, they have not yet been mentioned in any English language publications. For that matter, the Later Jin and Qing Invasions are still largely sidelined in non-Korean language scholarship and given scant attention when compared to studies on the Imjin War. Academic publications in the Korean language, despite having a clear superiority in the numbers of works covering the Qing invasion of Chosŏn and comparing diaries from the war, are still limited in their description of the invasion. Most importantly, works written in Korean appear ready to perpetuate the notion that two distinct political ideologies existed during the invasion, that both sides could not readily agree on the terms of peace, and that the Ming empire and Chinese civilisation were integral elements of identity for those opposing peace with the Qing. After reading passages from Kim Sanghŏn and Nam Kŭp’s diaries however, it should be clear that identities and loyalties during the invasion were much more complex, multifaceted, and require further investigation. There does not appear to have been a pure dichotomy dividing the government into clearly delineated factions arguing for or against peace. Rather, a set of competing immediate concerns such as concern for friends, family, political affiliates and a concern for greater and more spiritual matters concerning the state.

expressed through some factional debate but with considerable plasticity. After reading the diaries, four aspects became clearer and, at the same time, complicate our view of invasion.

The first problem concerns the existence of the two supposed political factions—the so-called Peace and Anti-peace Factions. In the diaries, those who were against a form of peace were simply referred to as “those who argued against peace” (K. chokhwaronja 强和論者), and those who were more willing to pursue a form of peace were referred to as “those who argued for peace” (K. chuhwaronja 主和論者). It is clear from the diaries that both sides were ready to pursue a form of peace, and to describe the sides as “pro-” or “anti-” peace masks the fact that both wanted a peace. This understanding of political affiliation is complicated by the fact that modern Korean scholarship continually uses the character p’ā 派 (faction) to describe the political division, even though the character was never used by the diarists to describe the opposing groups throughout the conflict. In fact, the use of ‘faction’ (p’ā 派) to describe the groups appears to be a modern expression, and its constant use makes it appear as if both sides were clearly delineated from one another. Some scholars have noticed this and have instead used the correct character, ‘argument’ (K. -ron 論), to characterize the nature of a discussion happening between the groups. It is clear that the divisions between both sides were looser and very different from what is currently understood, and the boundaries separating their arguments changed over time. The invasion may have served as a catalyst moment when the sides became more entrenched, or it could have reflected the realignment of politics after the 1623 coup and the continuing political competition between merit subjects, senior officials and censorial officials.

Second, the argument that the defense of the Ming was the most important and fundamental concept for those opposing peace appears to be overemphasised by current scholarship. The Ming Empire was mostly sidelined in the debate over peace and war in the diaries, even though they were mentioned more often in the government sources. Instead of the Ming, the sovereignty of the Chosŏn state and royal family, and concern for their own lives, took absolute precedence in

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88 Hŏ Taegu, “Pyŏngja horan kanghwa hyŏpsang ŭi ch’ui wa Chosŏn ui taeŭng” (The development of peace talks during the 1636 invasion and Chosŏn’s response), Choson sidan sahapko 52 (2010.3), 51–88.
92 Han Myŏnggi, “Myŏng-ch’ŏng kyoch’egi tongbuk’a chilsŏ wa chosŏn chibaech’ŭng ui taeŭng” (The East Asian order and the response of the Chosŏn elite during the Ming-Qing transition), Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil 37 (2000.9), 124–148; 130–137.
both Kim Sanghŏn’s and Nam Kŭp’s diaries. The most commonly cited reasons for continuing to fight were the Royal Ancestral Shrine (K. Chongmyo 宗廟) and the Altars to the spirits of Soil and (the Five) Grain(s) (K. Sajiktan 社稷壇). Kim Sanghŏn and Nam Kŭp mention the Shrine and Altars multiple times as reasons for Chosŏn to pursue a different path to peace. The Royal Ancestral Shrine is a large complex that housed the spirit tablets of the Yi dynasty of Chosŏn. The Altars of Soil and Grain consisted of two raised square mounds, with one dedicated to the god of the land (K. sa 社) and the other mound for the spirit of cereals and grain (K. chik 稷). The Shrine and Altars were widely recognized as the pillars of state in Chosŏn, and were part of an integrated concept of virtue-maintenance. The locations and tablets represented conceptual elements of the state, and some modern authors have gone so far as to affirm that the Royal Ancestral Shrine and the Altars of Soil and Grain represented the state itself and were also the locations where the Chosŏn state derived its basis and meaning. Together the Shrine and Altars produced an independent identity that supported the current form of government, enabled the rationale for the king’s right to rule, and provided a centre of state-wide identification.

Third, due to the fact that neither side of the political debate were totally committed to the Ming in the diaries, it appears that the reason to hold out and fight the enemy was to simply improve the terms of peace rather than winning the war outright. It was not as if the Anti-peace adherents were against peace itself, but rather they were against a type of peace that involved the loss of the crown prince and the personal surrender of King Injo. Kim Sanghŏn argued that the crown prince was vital for the continuation of the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain’s worship, while Nam Kŭp did not appear to share this idea. If the crown prince did not have to surrender personally, or if the emperor had not requested those who opposed peace, then the opposition to the peace may have looked very different.

Lastly, there was an unmentioned struggle brewing behind the scenes that involved the distrust between the military and the Anti-peace adherents. The military were clearly defending the fortress against probing Qing attacks, and

93 The Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain were frequently mentioned together and were often abbreviated as Shrine and Altars (K. Chongsa 宗社).
95 Kang Munsk and Yi Hyŏnjin, Chongmyo wa Sajik: Chosŏn ttŏbatch’in tu kidung (The Royal Ancestral Shrine and the Altars of Soil and Grain: the two pillars supporting Chosŏn) (Seoul: Ch’aek kwa hamkke, 2011), 13.
many soldiers suffered and died as a result of the weather. Nam recorded their suffering in detail and recounted how the military came to despise the Anti-peace advocates due to their short-sightedness. On the other hand, Kim rarely ever mentions the suffering of the soldiers and only criticizes their commanders. In the end, the military had to come to the side of those advocating peace due to the worsening situation and not because of their total fear of the enemy.

Although the diaries represent but two perspectives of the war, comparing the texts offers clues as to the true differences and similarities between the supposed factions. Both those supporting and opposing peace did not respect the Qing, but neither did they expect a full military victory. It was the nature of the surrender that became most important to both sides, and all defended their actions using the same argument: for the benefit of the Royal Ancestral Shrine and Altars of Soil and Grain (i.e. the state). Only the future of the crown prince and his place in the state’s identity appear to have been actually debated, as loyalty to the Ming stemming from the Imjin War and the benefits of Chinese civilization were swept away in favor of the urgent contemporary concerns of court and state.

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